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The Model Employment Termination Act: Fruitful
Seed or Noxious Weed?
You mustn't tell me you've got people to see-I put thirty-four years into
this firm ... and now I can't pay my insurance! You can't eat the orange
and throw the peel away-a man is not a piece of fruit!
A. Miller, Death of a Salesman, Act II at 82 (1949).
I. INTRODUCTION
In August 1991, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (hereinafter Commissioners) passed the
Model Employment Termination Act (hereinafter META).1
META is intended to reduce the uncertainty for both employers
and employees which has resulted from recent judicial incursion
into the nineteenth century employment at will doctrine. The Act
is, however, the product of a great deal of compromise, necessary
because employers, employees, unions, and other interest groups
must all be convinced that they will benefit from such a legislative
enactment if it is to pass in the state legislatures.
In 1988, Professor Theodore J. St. Antoine was appointed re-
porter for META by the Commissioners. Just prior to his appoint-
ment, he wrote a law review article in which he proposed a legisla-
tive solution to the problem of wrongful termination. In this paper,
the author will compare META with St. Antoine's original
proposal.
Throughout this paper, the protections and remedies available to
at-will employees under the common law will be compared with
the protections and remedies available under META. Based upon
this comparison, the author will assess whether META is, in fact, a
good idea from the perspective of the non-unionized "at-will"
employee.
1. Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Employment Termination Act, IERM
540:21 (1991) ("META"), drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, approved and recommended for enactment in all the states in August 1991, with
prefatory notes and comments. (Document on file with The Duquesne Law Review).
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A. The History of At-Will Employment
In the last half of the nineteenth century, the United States de-
veloped a unique rule regarding the employment relationship. Un-
like the English rule which presumed a contract for one year when
no period of employment was specified, the American rule held
that employers, absent a fixed-term contract, could dismiss their
employees "for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally
wrong." 2 Employees were likewise free to quit their jobs on the
same basis. This rule, known as the at-will employment doctrine,
flourished through the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.'
After World War II, several developments came together that
caused courts to more closely scrutinize the at-will employment
doctrine. First, unions negotiated collective bargaining agreements
which included provisions for arbitration of grievances and which
required employers to bear the burden of proving just cause for
discharge or discipline of employees." Indeed, during the heyday of
the unions, approximately twenty-eight per cent (28%) of the non-
agricultural workforce was covered by collective bargaining agree-
ments, ninety-five per cent (95%) of which had grievance and arbi-
tration provisions.
5
In addition to collective bargaining provisions, many employees
acquired statutory protection from unjust discharge as a result of
the civil rights movement of the 1960's. In the 1960's and 1970's,
many statutes were enacted which protected employees from dis-
charge because of race, religion, sex, age and national origin.' As a
result of such enactments, both employees and the courts became
increasingly sensitive to issues of fairness and due process.' Statu-
tory protection from "adverse action" was also extended to state
and federal employees through civil service provisions."
The recognition of employment as a property right protected by
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was another
expansion of protection from unjust dismissal for public employ-
2. META at 3, citing Payne v Western & A. R.R., 81 Tenn 507, 519-20 (1884).
3. META at 3
4. Cornelius Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the Develop-
ment of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 Wash L Rev 719, 729 (1991) ("Peck").
5. Peck at 729, citation omitted.
6. Id at 728, citation omitted.
7. William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbi-
tration, 13 Empl Rel L J 404, 409-10 (1987-88) ("Gould, Case").
8. Peck at 729-30.
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ees.9 In fact, one scholar has commented that the starting point for
evaluating the issue of wrongful discharge is:
the realization that in a modern industrialized economy employment is cen-
tral to one's existence and dignity . . . Along with marital relations and
religion, it is hard to think of what might be viewed as more vital in our
society than the opportunity to work and retain one's employment status. 0
For many public and private employees after World War II, the
job replaced home, family, church, neighborhood, and community
as the primary source of identity, object of loyalty, and major so-
cial unit.11 (It could even be argued that corporations requiring
middle management employees to uproot their families and move
every three or four years was one of the major causes of the shift
in loyalty and identity from the community to the corporation.)
Ironically, as middle management shifted its loyalty to the cor-
poration, such loyalty was rewarded with the rash of corporate
mergers and takeovers of the 1980's, which resulted in the dis-
placement of thousands of middle-level management personnel
and subsequent lawsuits."2 These cases were very difficult for both
judges and juries because of the subjective nature of the work done
by such employees. 3 The cases were no doubt also very difficult
because of the injustice done to these employees.
B. The History of Judicial Activism and the At-Will Employ-
ment Doctrine
It is estimated that as a result of the aforementioned statutory
and union protections afforded employees against unjust dismissal,
approximately thirty-five (35%) to forty per cent (40%) of all non-
agricultural employees had "substantial specific" protection
against unjust dismissal by the end of the 1970's.'4 Moreover, this
figure does not include the classes of employees protected by Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, under both of
which discharge of a protected employee is highly suspect. 5 Subse-
9. Id at 727-28.
10. William B. Gould IV, Job Security in the United States: Some Reflections on
Unfair Dismissal and Plant Closure Legislation from a Comparative Perspective, 67 Neb L
Rev 28, 30 (1988), citation omitted ("Gould, Perspective").
11. Paul H. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's
Perspective, 67 Neb L Rev 178, 181 (1988) ("Tobias").
12. Gould, Case at 409-10 (cited in note 7).
13. Id.




quently, since so many employees were protected in one form or
another, the courts began to question why "only white males under
the age of 40 lacked some kind of job protection . . ."I Stated
more seriously, the courts began to wonder why, if arbitrariness
with regard to race and sex was not tolerated as a basis for dismis-
sal, any arbitrariness should be tolerated with regard to any
employee.17
In response to the disparity between protection afforded private,
at-will employees and the protection afforded public, union and
protected classes of employees, the courts began to fashion judicial
exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine. 8 These exceptions
fall into three broad categories: contract analysis, tort analysis and
public policy analysis. 19
Under contract analysis, some courts have examined the original
employment agreement in order to find a contract. 20 Other courts
have looked at language in the personnel handbook or policy man-
ual as a basis for finding a contract.2" Still other courts have held
that where the employee confers extra consideration on the em-
ployer, for instance in the form of commissions, such consideration
creates an implied contract.22 Finally, some courts have relied upon
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, especially
where employees are on the eve of receiving accrued benefits in the
form of a pension or commission from sales.23 For example, in the
early 1980's the Montana Supreme Court began recognizing the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, under which huge
awards were granted to employees.2
16. Id at 732.
17. Id.
18. By 1974, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire articulated the growing concern
for fairness when it balanced an employer's interest in running his business as he saw fit
against the employee's interest in maintaining his employment, and the public's interest in
finding a proper balance between the two competing interests. Peck at 732-33, citing Monge
v Beebe Rubber Co., 114 NH 130, 316 A2d 549 (1974).
19. Comment, Reforming At-Will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U Mich J
L Ref 389, 394-401 (1983) ("Model").




24. This may well be one of the reasons Montana employers, "seek[ing] both relief
and certainty," endorsed enactment of the first state statute covering wrongful discharge.
Peck at 752 (cited in note 4) (citing Mont Code Ann § 39-2-903(1) (1987)). See also Cren-
shaw v Bozeman Deaconess Hospital, 213 Mont 488, 693 P2d 487 (Mont 1984); Gates v Life
of Montana Ins. Co., 196 Mont 178, 638 P2d 1063 (Mont 1982); and Dare v Montana Petro-
leum Mktg. Co., 212 Mont 274, 687 P2d 1015 (Mont 1984).
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In addition to contract analysis, the courts have used tort analy-
sis to afford relief to wrongfully discharged at-will employees. The-
ories the courts have used to grant relief to employees include re-
taliatory discharge, where an employee has been discharged after
blowing the whistle on employer wrongdoing, 5 and intentional in-
fliction of emotional harm. For an employee to recover under the
intentional infliction of emotional harm analysis, however, (s)he
must show outrageous behavior on the part of the employer.
2 6
Finally, the courts have resorted to public policy analysis in or-
der to afford wrongfully discharged employees some relief. This
analysis has been used where the employee has opposed unethical
activities on the part of the employer, has exercised a statutory
right, has refused to take a polygraph test, or has had jury or some
other civic duty to perform and has subsequently been termi-
nated.27 Courts are reluctant to rely too heavily on public policy,
however, as this area more than the others seems to be the particu-
lar domain of the legislature.28
C. Advantages of Legislation over Adjudication
Despite the valiant efforts of the courts to provide protection for
at-will employees who are unjustly dismissed, judicial relief has in-
herent shortcomings. First, courts will only hear cases and award
damages where there has been either a serious violation of public
policy, or a contractual breach; they will not impose an affirmative
duty on an employer to prove just cause in order to support a dis-
missal.29 In addition, even if an employee can get a day in court,
(s)he probably will not be able to afford it. Today, the average cost
to the employee to get to trial is around $10,000.30 Thus, even
when the employee is paying an attorney on a contingency fee ba-
sis, which is the way these cases are usually handled, the average
middle management or service industry non-unionized employee
will not be able to litigate his claim. 31 Furthermore, since the attor-
ney's fee is often contingent on recovery, and recovery is based
upon the employee's losses as determined by salary during employ-
25. Model at 399-401 (cited in note 19).
26. Id.
27. Id at 398-99.
28. Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads
Toward Full Flower, 67 Neb L Rev 56, 60 (1988) ("St. Antoine").
29. St Antoine at 65.




ment, lawyers have a built-in bias towards representing the highly
paid employee."2
Accordingly, recognizing the inherent shortcomings in judicial
solutions, scholars started proposing legislative solutions to the
problem of unjust dismissal twenty-five years ago.33 More recently,
legislatures have recognized and begun to address the problem. In
1980, a bill was introduced into the U.S. House of Representatives
which would have made unjust dismissal an unfair labor practice
under the NLRA; the bill did not, however, reach non-union em-
ployees.34 In addition, forty out of forty-five states and territories
responding to a recent academic survey indicated that bills had
been introduced in their legislatures in the past ten years concern-
ing "employment termination, at-will employment, or a related
subject. '3 5 While only one of these bills has become law,3" such in-
terest indicates that the time may be right for legislative
intervention.
D. Advantages of Arbitration over Litigation
The one characteristic shared by all of the model and proposed
statutes discussed herein is reliance on, or preference for, some
form of arbitration to hear unjust dismissal claims. One of the vir-
tues of arbitration over litigation is the huge cost savings. In fact,
from the employers' perspective, the biggest advantage of a legis-
lated solution to the problem of unjust dismissal is that, by having
unjust dismissal claims arbitrated rather than litigated, employers
will not be subject to the huge awards juries are likely to levy
against them." In a 1987 study of California wrongful discharge
cases, plaintiffs won seventy-eight per cent (78%) of the time with
average damages of $424,500.38 Legal fees to defend a wrongful dis-
charge action average around $80,000.39
32. Id.
33. See, for example, Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will us. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum L Rev 1404 (1967);
Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 Ohio St L J 1 (1979); and Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust
Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 Va L Rev 481 (1976).
34. Model at 403 (cited in note 19), citing the Corporate Democracy Act, HR 7010,
96th Cong, 2d Sess (1980).
35. META at 4 (cited in note 1), citing a survey by Professor Stuart Henry.
36. Mont Code Ann § 39-2-903(1) (1987).
37. St. Antoine at 69 (cited in note 28).
38. Id. The highest award reported during this period was $20 million.
39. META at 3 (cited in note 1).
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From the employees' perspective, it is estimated that middle or
upper-level management employees account for sixty (60) to eighty
per cent (80%) of all successful plaintiffs; lower level employees
rarely prevail. 0 Part of the reason for -these statistics is, no doubt,
the cost of litigating a claim for wrongful discharge. Employees can
spend up to $40,000 on legal fees in wrongful termination cases,
which can take a year or more.4 ' In contrast, arbitration takes a
few weeks and costs around $15,000 total per case.4" Studies indi-
cate that approximately 200,000 employees a year are unfairly ter-
minated.4 Of these, one study estimates that 12,000 to 15,000 of
the claims would have been arbitrated had such a remedy
existed."'
Besides the costs of going to court, the discharged employee also
faces the delay and formality inherent in court proceedings.4' With
courts backlogged for a year or more, an employee can ill afford to
wait for a day in court to find out if (s)he will be reinstated."' In
addition, because of the adversarial nature of judicial proceedings,
it is hard to reestablish a good working relationship in the event
reinstatement is ordered. 47 Finally, in court an employee must
prove an unjust dismissal with limited access to records and infor-
mation.48 Conversely, with most arbitration proceedings under col-
lective bargaining agreements, the burden is on the employer to
prove just cause for dismissal." Thus the employee would be enti-
tled to warnings before discharge unless behavior were egregious
and would get a chance to confront an accuser at a hearing,
thereby obtaining a measure of due process. e
The employer is also disadvantaged by court proceedings, facing
as it does the inconsistency and unpredictability of judicial reme-
dies from state to state, depending on the wrongful discharge the-
ory a particular state court adopts.51 For this reason, uniform arbi-
40. Id.
41. Why States Should Adopt the Model Employment Termination Act, National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Publicity Statement, 2 (1991) (on file
with The Duquesne Law Review).
42. Id.
43. Peck at 730 (cited in note 4) (citations omitted).
44. Id at 731 (citations omitted).
45. Model at 390 (cited in note 19).
46. Id at 402.
47. Id.
48. Id at 401-02.
49. St. Antoine at 65 (cited in note 28).
50. Gould, Case at 416 (cited in note 7).
51. Model at 401 (cited in note 19).
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tration would provide a much more consistent playing field for
employers who do business in more than one state.52 In addition,
arbitrators are less likely than juries to be sympathetic to employ-
ees' claims that they were dismissed for refusing to follow an order
they found morally reprehensible unless such employees have first
exhausted in-house avenues of redress." Nor would arbitrators be
as likely as juries to reverse layoffs based upon strictly economic
factors because they sympathized with the employee.5
II. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS: PROFESSOR ST. ANTOINE'S MODEL
COMPARED WITH META
Since the mid-1960's, scholars have been advocating a legislative
solution to the at-will dismissal problem. Various models have
been proposed, including a proposal advocated in a Comment in
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform in 198365 and
another proposal by Professor St. Antoine, who teaches at the Uni-
versity of Michigan, in 1988.56 Since Professor St. Antoine became
the Reporter for META shortly after he wrote his article proposing
an unjust dismissal statute, it is instructive to compare the St. An-
toine model with META in order to determine how Professor St.
Antoine's theory has yielded to the practicality of the Model Act.
A. Substantive Provisions
1. The Just Cause Standard
In his proposal, Professor St. Antoine first acknowledged that a
federal statute would be the ideal solution, but recognized that
such a statute was unlikely.5 7 He therefore opted for state statutes
which have the advantage of allowing for experimentation with dif-
ferent models.5 8 St. Antoine then discussed the issues any proposal
would have to confront. First, he recommended adoption of the
"just cause" standard without any further elaboration, arguing
that increased specificity could only lead to underinclusiveness and
that those who must hear just cause claims would have the entire
52. Thomas H. Barnard and Martin S. List, Defense Perspective on Individual Em-
ployment Rights, 67 Neb L Rev 193, 210 (1988) ("Barnard").
53. Gould, Case at 415-16 (cited in note 7.)
54. Id.
55. Model, at 394-401 (cited in note 19).
56. St. Antoine, at 56 (cited in note 28).




body of arbitral precedent at their disposal." St. Antoine then ad-
vocated that the statute remain "discreetly silent" on the burden
and quantum of proof required to prove unjust dismissal.60
META does in fact follow St. Antoine's proposal and adopt the
good cause standard for dismissals, specifying that unless the em-
ployer and employee enter into a severance pay agreement or agree
to employment for a specified duration as provided under Sections
4(c) and 4(d) of the statute, "an employer may not terminate the
employment of an employee without good cause."61 Ignoring St.
Antoine's advice, however, the statute not only attempts to define
"good cause, '"62 but gives examples in the Comments to Section
1(4).6" Good cause is defined in the Comment section as:
(i) a reasonable basis related to an individual employee for termination of
the employee's employment in view of relevant factors and circumstances,
which may include the employee's duties, responsibilities, conduct on the
job or otherwise, job performance, and employment record, or (ii) the exer-
cise of business judgment in good faith by the employer, including setting
its economic or institutional goals and determining methods to achieve
those goals, organizing and reorganizing operations, discontinuing, consoli-
dating, or divesting operations or positions or parts of operations or posi-
tions, determining the size of its work force and the nature of the positions
filled by its work force, and determining and changing standards of per-
formance for positions."
It is clear from the language of the statute that employees laid
off due to mergers and acquisitions or other company restructuring
will gain no protection from the statute, since they will be consid-
ered to have been discharged for good cause. This is in sharp con-
trast to the decisions of some arbitrators under collective bargain-
ing agreements, which call dismissals for economic reasons
"layoffs," thus avoiding the shadow "inevitably cast . . . on a
worker's character and reputation" by the term "discharge.'"
META's Comment section also reinforces the impression that
middle management and other merger and acquisition victims will
receive little relief from META. Specifically, the Comment states
that the statute is in no way intended to function as a plant closing
59. Id.
60. Id at 72.
61. META, § 3(a) at 17 (cited in note 1).
62. Id at § 1(4) at 9-10.
63. Id at Comment, § 1(4) at 11.
64. Id at § 1(4) at 9-10.




law; rather, an employer's decisions about the size and composition
of its work force vis a vis its economic goals are subject only to the
exercise of honest business judgment.66 Employers will therefore
have a great deal of latitude in determining how to structure their
operations, subject only to the constraints of applicable federal,
state and local anti-discrimination law. 7
Employers under META will have another advantage not held
by management in union shops: the unilateral ability to change the
performance standard for a job and to discharge employees who
cannot meet the new standard. 8 The Comment section explains
that the performance standard in highly competitive fields, includ-
ing most professions, could be "the most proficient performer
available for a particular position."69 Such a standard offers little
protection to the older worker.
The Comment section also lists non-economic examples of good
cause for termination. Included are theft, assault, fighting on the
job, destruction of property, use or possession of drugs or alcohol
on the job, insubordination, excessive absenteeism or tardiness, in-
competence, lack of productivity and inadequate performance or
neglect of duty.70 Off-duty conduct may also be grounds for good
cause discharge where, for instance, it is relevant to the employee's
71job performance or the employer's business reputation.
2. Burden of Proof
Besides ignoring Professor St. Antoine's advice not to define
good cause, META also ignores his suggestion that the statute re-
main "discreetly silent" as to the burden of proof" and provides
that (1) the complainant employee has-the burden of proving that
a termination was without good cause and (2) the complainant em-
ployer has the burden of proving that a termination was with good
cause.73 The employer becomes the complainant only in those cases
in which, prior to terminating an employee, the employer files a
complaint and demand for arbitration to determine whether there
66. META at Comment, § 1(4) at 12 (cited in note 1).
67. Id at 13.
68. META at § 1(4) at 13 (cited in note 1).
69. Id at Comment, § 1(4) at 13.
70. Id at 12.
71. Id at 12.
72. See note 60 and accompanying text.
73. META, § 6(e) at 28 (cited in note 1).
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is good cause for the termination of a named employee.7 ' Given
this shift in the burden of proof depending upon who files the com-
plaint, it is hard to imagine an employer who would be foolish
enough to file a complaint seeking determination of good cause
when he could simply discharge the employee, forcing him or her
to raise the complaint and thereby shoulder the burden of proof.
Regardless of who has the burden of proof, however, the employer
is required to present his case first under META unless the em-
ployee alleges a constructive discharge. 5 META uses the standard
adopted in sex discrimination cases for situations in which the em-
ployee makes out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge.76 In
such cases, "the employer, to avoid liability, must then establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated
the employment even in the absence of the impermissible
grounds."7
The above provisions seem to be a major concession to employ-
ers, far removed from the wrongful discharge standard under col-
lective bargaining agreements which force the employer to shoul-
der the burden of proof. 78 Collective bargaining agreements,
regarding discharge as "industrial capital punishment, 7 9 usually
require that employers prove just cause for discharge. 80 The quan-
tum of proof required to prove just cause has included the entire
range known to the legal community, depending upon the severity
of the charge against the employee and the resulting repercussions
in his or her life.8' Certainly then, employees would have been
much better off if META had followed Professor St. Antoine's rec-
ommendation and maintained a "discreet silence" on this subject."s
3. Coverage
a. Who is Covered
The most obvious distinction between Professor St. Antoine's
74. Id at § 5(c) at 25.
75. Id at § 6(e) at 28, citing § 1(8)(iii).
76. Id at Comment, § 6(f) at 30, citing Price Waterhouse v Hopkins, 490 US 228
(1989).
77. META at § 6(f) at 28.
78. Elkouri at 661 (cited in note 65).
79. Id, (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id at 662. Quanta of proof required have included: "sufficient to convince a rea-
sonable mind of guilt." "preponderance of the evidence," "clear and convincing evidence,"
and "beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
82. See note 60 and accompanying text.
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proposal and META is META's provision that the employer and
employee may enter into an express written agreement by which
the employee either agrees to additional justifications for good
cause termination or waives the right to a good cause determina-
tion altogether.8 3 Under Section 4(b), the employer and employee
may provide that:
the employee's failure to meet specified business-related standards of per-
formance or the employee's commission or omission of specified business-
related acts will constitute good cause for termination ...8
The Comment section explains that this provision affords the em-
ployer and employee "great flexibility" in agreeing upon perform-
ance standards as long as there is no "duress or overreaching by
either party."8 One must wonder what the Commissioners had in
mind when they expressed concern that the employee might over-
reach on this issue. One may also wonder what the quid pro quo is
for the employee who waives his rights.
Under Section 4(c) of META, by comparison, the employee is at
least provided with a quid pro quo for waiving his or her rights to
the requirement of good cause for termination. This section pro-
vides that the statutory good cause right may be waived if the em-
ployer and employee mutually agree that:
upon the termination of the employee for any reason other than willful mis-
conduct ... the employer will provide severance pay in an amount equal to
at least one month's pay for each period of employment totaling one year,
up to a maximum total payment equal to 30 months' pay at the employee's
rate of pay . . 86
In essence, Section 4(c) allows the employer to purchase the right
to terminate the employee at will.8 7 The Comment section explains
that this provision would most likely be used in agreements with
management personnel and key professionals. 8 Presumably such
employees are in a better bargaining position than lower level
white collar employees such as bank tellers, computer program-
mers and secretaries. Nonetheless, since employees under the Act
may be entitled to a lump-sum severance payment equal to 36
months' pay if the case is arbitrated,8 9 it is curious that, by waiving
83. META at § 4(b) & (c) at 19-20 (cited in note 1).
84. Id at § 4(b) at 19.
85. Id at Comment, § 4(b) at 23 (emphasis added).
86. Id at § 4(c) at 20.
87. Id at Comment, § 4(c) at 23.
88. Id at 23.
89. Id at § 7(b)(3) at 30-31.
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their rights under the Act and saving the employer the time and
cost of arbitration, they agree to a smaller, rather than a larger,
payment.
By contrast, Professor St. Antoine's approach to allowing em-
ployers and upper-level managers the "flexibility" of at-will em-
ployment was simply to exclude them from coverage under a
wrongful termination statute.90 He argued that middle, but not up-
per-level, managers should be covered and that probationary em-
ployees should not be protected.9' (It is not clear exactly where St.
Antoine would draw the line between middle and upper-level man-
agement.) Professor St. Antoine further argued that public em-
ployees, who already have constitutional due process and/or civil
service protection should also be exempted from coverage under
the Act.92 When it came to union employees, however, St. Antoine
was less emphatic. On the one hand, he acknowledged the preemp-
tion problem created by union employees' protection under federal
statutes such as National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and Rail-
way Labor Act (RLA).93 On the other hand, however, St. Antoine
saw no "principled grounds" for treating union employees differ-
ently from the nonunionized and argued that it is inherently unfair
for union employees to have to spend a bargaining chip in order to
obtain the same safeguards non-unionized employees obtain gra-
tis.9" ' After discussing recommendations by various other scholars
in the field, St. Antoine recommended that union employees be
covered, giving priority to the collective bargaining contract and
the duty of fair representation, after which the statutory protec-
tion would be available. 95 Still, St. Antoine acknowledged the prac-
ticality of excluding union employees. 96
META, closely paralleling St. Antoine's model in this area, ex-
tends coverage to unionized employees, providing that no rights of
employees against employers arising under state or federal statutes
or administrative rules and regulations having the force of law, or
under collective bargaining agreements, are displaced or extin-
guished by the Act.97 The Comment to the Act acknowledges the
90. St. Antoine at 72-73 (cited in note 56).
91. Id.
92. Id at 73.
93. Id at 74.
94. Id at 75.
95. Id at 75-76.
96. Id at 76.
97. META at § 2(e) at 14-15 (cited in note 1).
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preemption problem by providing that unionized employees sub-
ject to federal law are entitled to exercise their rights under the
Act to the extent allowed by the developing law of preemption. 8
The Act leaves to the individual states, however, the decision
whether META should apply to the state's employees or employ-
ees of its political subdivisions." The Comment explains that uni-
formity is less important with regard to public employees since (1)
they are not employed by multi-state employers, and (2) they usu-
ally have protection through civil service.100
In return for protection under the Act, terminated employees re-
linquish all common-law rights and claims against their employer
and its agents which are based on the termination. 10' The Com-
ment section explains that the rights and claims that are lost are
primarily tort actions of defamation, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress "and the like."'0 3 Noting that there may be "inde-
pendent" tort actions for assault, malicious prosecution, false im-
prisonment, etc., the Comment then explains that whether the tort
action is abolished depends upon "whether its basis is the termina-
tion itself or acts taken or statements made that are reasonably
necessary to initiate or effect the termination."'0 3 Interpretation of
this language should provide lawyers with years of steady employ-
ment. In addition, according to the Comment section, employees
also relinquish contract actions based on implied-in-fact employ-
ment agreements in exchange for protection under the Act.1 4 In-
terestingly, nothing is said about abolishing actions based upon the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, one of the biggest financial
bonanzas to terminated employees."0 5 Since the Comment only
mentions contract actions based upon implied employment agree-
ments and does not include an ejusdem generis provision as it
does with tort actions,' 06 perhaps plaintiff's attorneys will be molli-
fied into supporting the Act based upon this possible loophole.
While META covers both union and some public employees, it
98. Id at Comment, § 2(d), (e) at 16, citing Lingle v Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc.,
486 US 399, 108 SCt 1877 (1988).
99. META at § 1(2) at 9 (cited in note 1).
100. Id at Comment, § 1(2) at 11.
101. Id at § 2(c) at 14.
102. Id at Comment, § 2(c) at 15.
103. Id.
104. Id at 15-16.
105. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
106. See notes 102-103 and accompanying text.
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expressly does not cover: (1) independent contractors;10 7 (2) em-
ployees who enter into express or implied contracts of employment
for a specified duration;108 or (3) probationary, temporary or part-
time employees.'09 A probationary employee is defined in the Act
as one who has worked for the employer for less than one year." 0
Seasonal workers can, however, be covered by the Act since tempo-
rary breaks in service of one year or less do not necessarily destroy
prior employment status."' Part-time work is defined as less than
520 hours during the twenty-six (26) weeks immediately preceding
termination;" therefore, employees who work twenty or more
hours per week on the average are covered by the Act." 3 This is
good news for many part-time workers. Moreover, while Professor
St. Antoine would exclude from coverage those employees working
for employers employing fewer than ten or fifteen employees," 4
META includes employees working for employers employing five
or more employees, excluding immediate family members." 5
b. What is covered
Another major difference between Professor St. Antoine's recom-
mendation and the Model Act concerns the kinds of discipline cov-
ered. Professor St. Antoine recommended that other forms of disci-
pline, such as extended suspension, demotion, denied promotion
and onerous job assignments be included in a wrongful termination
statute."' Citing the European experience, St. Antoine argued that
with such protection, it is harder for employers to hide the unfair
treatment of employees behind economic downturns." 7 In addi-
tion, St. Antoine suggested that a wrongful termination statute fol-
low the example of the Montana wrongful discharge statute,"8
which explicitly covers constructive discharge. Constructive dis-
charge is defined in the Montana statute as:
'voluntary termination of employment by an employee because of a situa-
107. META at §1(1) at 9 (cited in note 1).
108. Id at § 2(b) at 14.
109. Id at § 3(b) at 17-18.
110. Id at Comment, § 3(b) at 18.
111. Id at 18-19.
112. Id at § 3(b) at 17-18.
113. Id at Comment, § 3(b) at 8.
114. St. Antoine at 73 (cited in note 56).
115. META at § 1(2) at 9 (cited in note 1).
116. St. Antoine at 76 (cited in note 56).
117. Id at 76-77.
118. See footnote 24 and accompanying text.
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tion created by an act or omission of the employer . . . so intolerable that
voluntary termination is the only reasonable alternative.'1
While META declines St. Antoine's invitation to extend just
cause protection to forms of discipline other than discharge,
META does include constructive discharge within its definition of
"termination," using language remarkably similar to that used in
the Montana statute, quoted above:
.. a quitting of employment or a retirement by an employee induced by an
act or omission of the employer, after notice to the employer of the act or
omission without appropriate relief by the employer, so intolerable that
under the circumstances a reasonable individual would quit or retire.'"
There are two readily apparent differences between the Montana
statute's constructive discharge language recommended by St. An-
toine and META's constructive discharge provision. The first is
the inclusion in META of a requirement that the employee notify
the employer of an act or omission compelling voluntary termina-
tion.121 Such a requirement seems reasonable, as it allows the em-
ployer an opportunity to remedy an unacceptable situation before
losing a valuable employee. Moreover, it should not be unduly bur-
densome to the employee. The second difference between META
and the Montana statute on the issue of constructive discharge is
that META does not require that quitting be the only reasonable
alternative available to the employee; rather, META merely re-
quires the employee to prove that under the circumstances, a rea-
sonable individual would quit or retire. Proving reasonableness is a
much lighter burden than proving no choice. META is therefore
more favorable to the employee than the Montana statute recom-
mended by St. Antoine on this point.
B. Procedural Provisions
1. Arbitration
In addition to the substantive similarities and differences be-
tween META and Professor St. Antoine's proposed act, there are
also procedural similarities and differences. The most important
procedural aspect of both plans is that they recommend arbitration
as the preferred route to settling disputes in just cause termination
cases. Professor St. Antoine acknowledged that hearing officers and
119. St. Antoine at 76, citing Mont. Code Ann. § 39-2-903(1) (1987).




agencies could be given responsibility for settling such disputes,
but argued that the arbitration model has been proven superior for
just cause determinations.' Among the advantages of arbitration,
St. Antoine cited the vast body of precedent, both procedurally
and substantively, available regarding just cause claims.'2 3 In addi-
tion, he noted that there is an established nucleus of experienced
arbitrators who can train those less experienced,' and explained
that this core of experienced arbitrators allows for flexibility since
the state would not have to hire a large permanent staff at the
outset until the caseload could be determined.'2 5 He further sug-
gested that the state could use a mix of staff and free-lance arbi-
trators, thereby allowing it to keep permanent staff to a mini-
mum."2 6 Lastly, St. Antoine argued that arbitration works well in
the just cause setting as opposed, for example, to the social secur-
ity setting, because there is not the need for detailed expertise in
just cause claims that there is with social security and some other
agency claims.'
2 7
META, like Professor St. Antoine, adopts the arbitration model
as its preferred enforcement procedure. META, however, also pro-
vides in an appendix two alternative means of enforcing the Act."'
The first alternative allows a state to assign enforcement of the Act
to a new or existing administrative agency. " The second alterna-
tive would leave enforcement to the civil courts.'30 While a case
can probably be made for administrative agency enforcement of
META, it is hard to imagine what benefits accrue to employees by
keeping enforcement in the courts when a primary criticism of the
existing situation is that the courts are too costly, too formal and
too slow.'3 ' Thus, by utilizing the second alternative, the state does
little more than hand back to its employees all of the disadvan-
tages of going to court, stripped of the incentive of a potential
large jury award.'3 2
Comparing the arbitration models proposed by St. Antoine and




126. Id at 77-78.
127. Id.
128. META at Appendix at 39 (cited in note 1).
129. Id at Appendix, Alternative A at 39-40.
130. Id at Appendix, Alternative B at 41-44.
131. See notes 29-50 and accompanying text.
132. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
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META reveals that both St. Antoine and META leave it to the
discretion of each state to decide whether an existing or new
agency should enforce the termination statute.' St. Antoine's pro-
posal offered existing administrative agencies, civil rights commis-
sions or state labor departments as possible alternatives.13 4 META
lists state labor departments, labor relations commissions, media-
tion services or unemployment compensation bureaus as possibili-
ties, but also suggests that day-to-day operations might be dele-
gated to an outside private agency such as the American
Arbitration Association.
13 5
On the issue of pre-arbitration proceedings, St. Antoine followed
Michigan and California proposals providing a stage prior to arbi-
tration during which claims that could be settled before reaching
arbitration are screened out and referred to mediation.'36 (In an
administrative agency setting, St. Antoine advocated the use of a
"reasonable cause" determination by an agency official at the pre-
hearing stage.)1
3 7
META, in contrast, provides for no such pre-arbitration evalua-
tion. Instead, the employee may file a complaint and demand for
arbitration within 180 days of termination unless (s)he is pursuing
internal remedies within the company, in which case the time for
filing is temporarily suspended. 38 Employees are not, however, re-
quired by the Act to pursue such internal remedies. 39 The only
pre-arbitration procedure provided by META is optional discov-
ery, allowable at the discretion of the arbitrator. 40 Minimally, the
employee is entitled to a complete copy of his or her personnel
file."' Under META, employers may also file a complaint and de-
mand for arbitration to determine whether they have good cause
for terminating an employee."' Since the burden of proof shifts to
the party who files, however, it seems unlikely, as, discussed earlier,
that employers will have much incentive to use this feature of
133. St. Antoine at 77 (cited in note 56); META at Comment,
§ 6(a) (cited in note 1).
134. St. Antoine at 77 (cited in note 56).
135. META at Comment, § 6(a) at 28-29 (cited in note 1).
136. St. Antoine at 78 (cited in note 56).
137. Id.
138. META at §5(a) at 24-25 (cited in note 1).
139. Id at 25.
140. Id at § 6(c) at 27-28.
141. Id.
142. Id at §5(c) at 25.
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META. 14 Both META and St. Antoine require a nominal filing fee
in order to discourage frivolous claims. St. Antoine recommended
that the fee be approximately $100.1,1 META leaves the amount
open, but requires that it not exceed the maximum filing fee for a
civil suit."'
2. Remedies and Damages
Assuming the employee prevails on the claim of unjust dis-
charge, St. Antoine recommended that the arbitrator decide upon
the appropriate remedy.1" 6 Among the options available to the ar-
bitrator, St. Antoine suggested reinstatement with or without back
pay, or, where reinstatement is not appropriate, some form of sev-
erance pay which includes payment for benefits lost.' 47 He then
reviewed provisions various states have considered. California's
proposed statute allowed two years' pay with interest and benefits
where reinstatement was not appropriate, with attorneys' fees and
costs to the prevailing party.1 48 The Michigan bill provided for a
severance payment but no attorneys' fees. 4 9 The Montana provi-
sion, the only one ultimately adopted, permits no common law ac-
tions but allows punitive damages where the employee proves ac-
tual fraud or malice. 160 The Montana statute also provides four
years of lost wages and benefits; reinstatement is not mentioned.
15
Notably, St. Antoine expressed concern that without union sup-
port, reinstatement may prove to be very difficult as the returning
employee may face a hostile work environment alone.6 2 Interest-
ingly, this is the attitude of most European countries, where rein-
statement is rarely an option and, even where it is an option, it is
rarely exercised.
153
Conversely, META adopts reinstatement as the preferred rem-
edy for terminations under the Act, recommending reinstatement
143. See notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
144. St. Antoine at 80 (cited in note 56).
145. META at § 5(e) at 26 (cited in note 1).







153. Gould, Perspective at 51 (cited in note 10). See also Herbert L. Sherman Jr.,
Reinstatement as a Remedy for Unfair Dismissal in Common Market Countries, 29 Am J
Comp L 467 (1981) and Samuel Estreicher, Unjust Dismissal Laws: Some Cautionary
Notes, 33 Am J Comp L 310, 319 & 322 (1985).
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either to the employee's prior job or to a comparable position. 5 4
As for the issue of retaliation by the employer against the rein-
stated employee or any other party lawfully participating in the
wrongful discharge proceedings, the problem is addressed in
META by the provision that an employer who directly or indi-
rectly retaliates can be held liable for damages, including punitive
damages, and attorney fees. " The wronged employee is entitled to
bring a separate civil action to enforce this liability. 56
As St. Antoine suggested, however, the arbitrator may choose
remedies other than reinstatement under META. One option the
arbitrator may choose under META is full or partial backpay with
interest plus reimbursement for lost fringe benefits, with the em-
ployee required to exercise due diligence to mitigate damages.1' 7
Another option is a lump-sum severance payment at the em-
ployee's rate of pay for a period not exceeding thirty-six (36)
months, plus the value of fringe benefits lost, less likely earnings
and benefits from employment elsewhere. 1' Employees are also
entitled under META to reasonable attorney's fees and costs. "
Moreover, where an arbitrator finds that an employee has been ter-
minated without good cause, but none of the aforementioned reme-
dies is appropriate, the arbitrator is permitted to issue an "award
in the nature of a 'declaratory judgment' to vindicate the rights of
the employee."' 60
Furthermore, under META, if the arbitrator sustains an em-
ployer's complaint, the employer gets a finding that there was good
cause for terminating an employee."' Conversely, if the arbitrator
dismisses the employer's complaint, the employee may be awarded
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 62 In addition, if the arbitrator
finds that an employee's complaint was "frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation," the arbitrator may dismiss the complaint
and award attorney's fees and costs to the prevailing employer.
63
Finally, arbitrators may only make awards as provided by the stat-
ute; they may not award damages for "pain and suffering, emo-
154. META, § 7(b)(1) at 30 and Comment, § 7(b)(3) at 33 (cited in note 1).
155. Idat§ 10 at 37.
156. Id.
157. Id at § 7(b)(2) at 30 and Comment at 32-33.
158. Id at §7(b)(3) at 30-31.
159. Id at § 7(b)(4) at 31.
160. Id at Comment, § 7(b) at 32.
161. Id at §7(f) at 32.
162. Id.
163. Id at § 7(e) at 32.
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tional distress, defamation, fraud, or other injury under the com-
mon law; punitive damages; compensatory damages; or any other
monetary award."'" The implications of this section are discussed
supra.
165
In many ways, the provisions of META concerning remedies and
damages parallel fairly closely the various provisions found in
wrongful termination bills proposed over the years in various state
legislatures.'66 One exception, however, is the META provision
that employees mitigate damages by seeking employment after a
termination and by seeking health and disability insurance cover-
age. 167 This provision seems highly impractical for two reasons.
First, if the employee is unemployed, (s)he will be in no position to
pay for insurance. Second, if the employee wants to be reinstated,
(s)he will not be able to make an honest commitment to another
employer for any length of time. This is particularly true for man-
agement-level employees, where the expectation is that someone
who is hired plans to stay, and where training for the job can take
months or even years. While employees are generally required to
mitigate damages under collective bargaining agreements,168 an al-
lowance should be made under META for the fact that mitigating
damages will be much more difficult for employees whose skills are
not easily transferable to a different workplace for a short period
of time.
Another troublesome provision of the Act in the area of remedies
and damages is the requirement that a lump sum severance pay-
ment to an employee be reduced by the "likely earnings and bene-
fits from employment elsewhere. . . .taking into account such eq-
uitable considerations as the employee's length of service . . . and
the reasons for the termination . . .""' The Comments refer to
this provision as the concept of proportionality, under which the
employer's liability is determined based on an assessment of the
employee's likely loss together with the employer's responsibility
for that loss. 170 It does not make sense, however, that an employer
who has wrongfully discharged an employee under the limited
terms of wrongful discharge covered by this statute should then be
164. Id at § 7(d) at 31-32.
165. See notes 101-106 and accompanying text.
166. See notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
167. See note 157 and accompanying text.
168. Elkouri at 357-60 (cited in note 65).
169. META at § 7(b)(3) at 30-31 (cited in note 1).
170. Id at Comment, § 7(b)(3) at 33.
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able to reduce the judgment against him by having the arbitrator
estimate what the employee might be able to earn elsewhere in the
future. In contract law, one cannot be awarded damages that are
speculative, contingent or remote. Here, the employer's damages
are reduced on the basis of speculation, contingency and remote-
ness. Not only is there no practical way to calculate such an adjust-
ment to damages, but the concept is theoretically unsound. If an
employer is guilty of wrongfully discharging an employee, (s)he
should be forced to pay for the wrongdoing, regardless of the likeli-
hood that the worker might gain employment elsewhere.
3. Judicial Review and Enforcement
Once the arbitrator has made a determination, there is always
the possibility that either the employer or employee will wish to
appeal. Professor St. Antoine's recommendation was that arbitra-
tion be final and binding; however he recognized that a particular
state constitution may require a review of the arbitral award." 1
Where such is the case, St. Antoine suggested that the standard of
review be fairly deferential, requiring only that the arbitrator's
award be "supported by competent, material, and substantial evi-
dence on the record considered as a whole. ' 17 2 Since this standard
requires a record of the arbitration hearing, Prof. St. Antoine rec-
ommended that a tape recorder be used in order to control costs. 17 3
This is, in fact, the approach proposed in the Michigan wrongful
termination bill.
174
On the issue of review, META presumes that both parties will be
entitled to judicial review of the arbitration decision. META there-
fore provides that either party may apply for vacation or modifica-
tion of the arbitration award in whatever court is appropriate
within ninety (90) days, or for enforcement of the award at any
time. "'75 As to the standard of review, the Act adopts an even more
deferential standard of review than St. Antoine proposed, allowing
for vacation or modification of an award only where: (1) the court
finds that an award was procured by corruption, fraud or other im-
proper means; (2) there was evidence of partiality or misconduct
by the arbitrator; (3) the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers; (4)




175. META at § 8(a) & (b) at 34 (cited in note 1).
Vol. 3 1: 111
Comments
the arbitrator committed a prejudicial error of law; or (5) there is
some other ground specified by the particular state under a its own
arbitration statute.
176
The Comment section to the Act further notes that while judi-
cial review of arbitration awards under collective bargaining agree-
ments has been sharply limited by the Supreme Court, the basis
for the Supreme Court's position has been that collective bargain-
ing agreements are contracts voluntarily agreed upon by both par-
ties.17 7 In contrast, the Comment section notes that where individ-
ual statutory rights have been the issue, the Court has not been as
deferential to arbitration awards. 1 7 Since META creates an indi-
vidual statutory right, the Comment indicates that the Supreme
Court would most likely follow the latter approach.17 9 The Com-
ment seems to advocate, however, that courts employ as deferen-
tial a standard of review as is constitutionally permissible, presum-
ably in the interest of finality with its concomitant money and
time savings. There would seem to be little need under the pro-
posed standard for a review of the facts of a case; however, a rec-
ord of the arbitral hearing might still be necessary in order to de-
termine arbitrator partiality or conduct prejudicing the rights of
one of the parties. Notably, the statute does not make provision for
such a record.
4. Costs
Finally, both Professor St. Antoine and META address the issue
of costs. Under collective bargaining agreements, the costs of arbi-
tration are usually split 50-50 between the union and the em-
ployer.180 St. Antoine recognized, however, that this could pose a
problem for an individual bringing a complaint since fifteen years
ago a typical one day hearing cost the union $2,200.81 At such a
rate, recently terminated lower-level white collar employees with
no income would be in no position to bear such costs. St. Antoine
next reviewed suggestions from various scholars, and proposals in
various state bills. Among the alternatives he noted were: having
176. Id at § 8(c)(1)-(5) at 35.
177. Id at Comment, § 8(c)(4) at 36, citing Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 US 593 (1960); and Paperworkers v. Misco, Inc., 484 US 29 (1987).
178. META at Comment, § 8(c)(4) at 36, citing Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co., 415
US 36 (1974); Barrentine v Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 US 728 (1981).
179. META at Comment § 8(c)(4) at 36.




the state pay, just as it does for courts and judges (Summers); re-
quiring both parties to share the costs equally (California and
Michigan); or allowing the employee to recoup the costs of arbitra-
tion from the employer if the employee prevailed (Montana).182
Since under St. Antoine's plan, the state would set the rate of pay
for arbitrators (since it would be paying the bill), St. Antoine rec-
ognized a potential problem. He realized that experienced arbitra-
tors might be unwilling to handle state-paid claims, where the rate
of pay would be substantially less than the rate normally re-
ceived. 8 ' He therefore suggested that the statute leave open the
issue of amount, allowing the parties to determine the quality of
arbitration they want.18' Such a suggestion presumes that there are
"state arbitrators" available who are not as qualified as the free-
lance experienced arbitrators.
Once again, META follows the Montana approach, allowing em-
ployees to recoup the costs of arbitration plus reasonable attor-
ney's fees in cases where they prevail.8 5 Only where an employee's
claim is frivolous are attorney's fees and costs awarded to the em-
ployer. 86 The statute leaves open, however, the question of attor-
ney's fees and costs where the employee's claim is not frivolous or
unreasonable, but where the employee nonetheless does not prevail
on the merits. Presumably the defeated, unemployed employee
must absorb such costs. The Comment section acknowledges that
in principle, the state should finance the enforcement of a public
right.'87 Nevertheless, the Commissioners recognize that tight state
budgets may force states to require the parties to absorb some or
all of the costs.' The Comments therefore suggest that perhaps a
cap should be placed on the employee's liability, limited to one or
two weeks' pre-termination pay, or that a special tax be imposed
on employers to cover the cost of enforcing the statute. 189 Since
there is little likelihood that such a tax would pass, employers and
employees are back to sharing costs. This means that the arbitra-
tor may have a very hard time collecting his or her fee. It also
means that if the employee wants to be represented by an attor-
182. Id (citations omitted).
183. Id at 81.
184. Id.
185. META at §§ 7(b)(4) at 31 and 7(f) at 32 (cited in note I).
186. Id at § 7(e) at 32 (see note 163 and accompanying text).
187. Id at Comment, § 5(e) at 26.
188. Id.
189. Id at 26-27.
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ney, (s)he must try to find one who will work on a contingency fee
basis where the most the employee can hope to win is back pay or
a lump sum severance amount, eroded by mitigation. This comes
pretty close to pro bono work for the attorney.
The Comment section further acknowledges that attorney fees
are an issue, stating that META's language in this section "delib-
erately tracks" the language of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, and of Supreme Court decisions interpreting Title VII.190 In
determining reasonable attorney fees, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that, where a small monetary award is being pursued, at-
torney fees may justifiably be greater than the amount of the
award.19" ' What the Comments do not recognize is that Title VII
was an addition to employee rights, for which they gave up noth-
ing. META, on the other hand, requires employees to relinquish
their common law rights in exchange for statutory protection. Fur-
thermore, Title VII allows the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission to bring a civil action against an employer if the em-
ployer refuses to agree to a conciliation agreement. 92 No such
agency support is available to the wrongfully discharged employee
under META. In addition, the 1991 amendment to the 1964 Civil
Rights Act allows employees to recover compensatory and punitive
damages where intentional discrimination is proved. 193 Under
META, employees expressly waive their rights to compensatory
and punitive damages, regardless of the egregiousness of the dis-
charge.'" Thus it appears as if, in addition to relinquishing their
common law rights, employees under META are required con-
structively to relinquish their right to be represented by an
attorney.
III. CONCLUSION
It is clear that the nineteenth century doctrine of at-will employ-
ment is languishing. When it finally withers and dies, few, except
for the law and economics scholars, will miss it. 9 5 Nevertheless,
190. Id at Comment, §§ 7(b)(4), 7(c)(2), 7(e), and 7(f) at 34, citing Albemarle Paper
Co. v Moody, 422 US 405 (1975); Christiansburg Garment Co. v EEOC, 434 US 412 (1978).
191. META at Comment, §§ 7(b)(4), 7(c)(2),*7(e) and 7(f) at 34, citing City of River-
side v Rivera, 477 US 561 (1986); Blum v Stenson, 465 US 886 (1984).
192. 42 USCA 2000e-5(f), as amended by 102 PL 166 (1991) S 1745, 105 Stat 1071
(The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Co).
193. 102 PL 166 § 102 (1991).
194. META at §7(d) at 31-32 (cited in note 1).
195. St. Antoine at 66 (cited in note 56) citing Richard Epstein, In Defense of the
Contract at Will, 51 U Chi L Rev 947 (1984).
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both employers and employees are justifiably concerned that what
takes the place of the doctrine is, in fact, an improved strain of
employment law and not a vexatious weed.
Employers are concerned that they will be asked to absorb the
cost of society's applying its "general values of fairness" to the
workplace, thus making employers "guarantors of rights generally
thought to be afforded solely by governments.'" 196 Employers there-
fore are asking that those proposing changes in termination law
take into account the costs of "reshaping the workplace," because
these costs will be passed along to society through higher prices."9 7
Employers are also concerned about the dilemma in which they
currently find themselves in certain areas of the law, especially
drug or AIDS testing. For instance, employers are concerned about
liability for damages caused by employees; however, they are also
concerned about liability to employees for wrongfully discharging
them if they test positive for drug use or AIDS and for invasions of
privacy for requiring that employees be tested.19 Some employers
are therefore requesting national legislation so that they do not
have to keep abreast of fifty conflicting sets of rules.
META addresses some of the employers' concerns, providing as
it does that use or possession of drugs or alcohol on the job quali-
fies as good cause for dismissal and that such conduct off-duty can
be grounds for dismissal where it is relevant to the employee's job
performance or the employer's reputation.'99 META does not,
however, address AIDS. In addition, since META is a model act
rather than a uniform act,200 it still leaves room for states to adopt
substantially differing standards for just cause termination. As a
result, employers could continue to face the problem of dealing
196. Barnard at 209 (cited in note 52).
197. Id.
198. Id at 205-207.
199. META at Comment, § 1(4) at 12 (cited in note 1).
200. "An act shall be designated a 'Uniform Law Commissioner's Model' (or 'ULC
Model') Act if
(i) 'uniformity' may be a desirable objective, although not a principal objective;
(ii) the act may promote uniformity and minimize diversity, even though a significant
number of jurisdictions may not adopt the act in its entirety; or
(iii) the purposes of the act can be substantially achieved, even though it is not
adopted in its entirety by every state."
META at 7, citing the "Statement of Policy Establishing Criteria and Procedures for Desig-
nation and Consideration of Acts" adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws on August 2, 1988. In the instant case, the Employment Termina-
tion Act was defeated by the Conference as a uniform act, which would have required that
states adopt it as it was drafted by the Commissioners.
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with widely varying standards of just cause termination from state
to state.
The employees' attorneys are equally concerned about the ef-
fects of a legislative solution on the problem of wrongful termina-
tion. Aside from their obvious self-interest in handsome contin-
gency fees resulting from huge jury awards, plaintiff's attorneys in
wrongful termination cases have some legitimate concerns for their
clients. Employees are, in fact, giving up a common law right in
exchange for statutory protection. Therefore, they must be certain
that they maximize the bargaining potential of the chip they are
relinquishing. After all, once the right is gone, it is gone forever.
One plaintiff's attorney, Paul H. Tobias, who has written about the
problems of at-will employees acknowledged that there is a need
for legislation in order to afford the poor, lower-ranked employees
access to some form of redress when they are wrongfully termi-
nated.201 Tobias recommended federal legislation, however, in or-
der to provide uniform protection, recognizing that many employ-
ers do business in a number of states.2 2 He also suggested a two-
tier compromise: employees would be afforded statutory protection
in the form of small claims arbitration for most cases; the courts,
however, would remain open for larger, more complicated wrongful
discharge claims.203 Such an approach would certainly go far to-
ward remedying some of the cost issues existing under META.20 "
Other issues such as coverage, mitigation, and costs of small claims
arbitration would, however, remain unresolved.
If META or any other model wrongful termination act is to suc-
ceed, it must garner the support of enough self-interest lobbies and
pressure groups to shepherd it through the legislative process.203
So far, some of the strongest support for the Act is coming from
organized labor. The United Auto Workers, the American Federa-
tion of State, County and Municipal Employees and the California
State Federation of Labor have supported this type of legislation
for some time. 06 Recently the AFL-CIO added its support.20 7 The
201. Paul H. Tobias, Current Trends in Employment Dismissal Law: The Plaintiff's
Perspective, 67 Neb L Rev 178, 190 (1988) ("Tobias").
202. Id.
203. Id at 191.
204. See notes 180-94 and accompanying text.
205. Peck at 751 (cited in note 4), citing Cornelius Peck, The Role of the Courts and
Legislatures in the Reform of Tort Law, 48 Minn L Rev 265 (1963).
206. Stanley M. Fisher, Model Employment Termination Act ("META"), Speech
Before the National Conference of State Legislatures, Labor Issues, 1992: Rebuilding
America at 6 (San Diego, Nov 1991) (on file with The Duquesne Law Review) ("Fisher").
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ACLU also supports the Act, calling META the most important
legislation since the National Labor Relations Act.08 In addition,
the Act has received the support of leaders of various arbitration
groups including Howard S. Block, the former president of the Na-
tional Academy of Arbitrators.0 9 Not surprisingly, the one group
violently opposed to META is the organized plaintiff's bar.10
While the opposition of the plaintiff's bar can be explained in
terms of self-interest, it can also be explained in terms of client
concern. Many of these concerns have been outlined above.2 1'
Moreover, while the rest of the legal community scoffs at the plain-
tiff's bar for its self-serving attitude, some of the motives of organ-
ized labor and arbitration groups may be equally self-serving. Un-
ions, for instance, stand to gain a statutory right to protection
from unjust discharge, thereby eliminating the necessity to bargain
for such a right.211 They also see an opportunity to expand their
role, representing workers in wrongful discharge claims outside the
confines of collective bargaining agreements. 13 Unions also stand
to gain from the elimination of huge jury awards for wrongful dis-
charge claims which make small union awards seem very unsatis-
factory. 1 4 Arbitration groups, likewise, stand to gain enormous
business from the enactment of META, which specifically lists the
American Arbitration Association as a likely candidate for the day-
to-day administration of the Act.
215
Perhaps the group that stands to gain the most, however, is the
employer coalition. As Professor St. Antoine stated:
One [can] well imagine that eventually an informed employer lobby might
conclude that just cause legislation, which would exclude jury verdicts and
punitive damages, [is] the preferable solution.21 6
Other scholars agree, believing that judicial decisions will perform
a "catalytic function," causing employers to prefer a legislative
207. Gould, Perspective at 40-41 (cited in note 10), citing AFL-CIO Executive Council,
Statement on the Employment-at- Will Doctrine, 3 (Bal Harbour, Fla, Feb 20, 1987).
208. Fisher at 7 (cited in note 206).
209. Id, citing Howard S. Block in his address to 500 management and labor repre-
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210. Fisher at 6 (cited in note 206). See also Randall Samborn, At-Will Doctrine
under Fire: Model Act Divides Employment Bar, 14 Natl Law J 1 (Oct 14, 1991).
211. See notes 101-106 and 200-204 and accompanying text.
212. St. Antoine at 75 (cited in note 56).
213. Gould, Case at 417 (cited in note 7) (citation omitted).
214. Id.
215. META at Comment, § 6(a) at 28-29 (cited in note 1).
216. St. Antoine at 69 (cited in note 56).
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remedy.211
Unfortunately, the only parties without an effective lobby are
the at-will employees themselves, who by definition are unorgan-
ized. Only the plaintiff's bar can speak for them. Perhaps, there-
fore, legislators should listen a little more closely to the plaintiffs
bar, filtering out the self-interest in order to hear the issues that
are of genuine concern to at-will employees. After all, the Commis-
sioners apparently afforded other interest groups this
consideration.
One year after its adoption, the future of META still remains
uncertain. As one observer noted, ". . . it is impossible to predict
how many states will adopt [META] ..,211 The same observer
also noted, however, that:
the action of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in promulgating [META] is, in itself, a harbinger of possible statutory
developments on the state level." '
Moreover, at least one state Supreme Court justice sees the legisla-
tive handwriting on the wall. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Zim-
merman of the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the majority of
his Court that the discharge of an employee in violation of public
policy should be actionable under Utah law, but argued that the
action should lie in contract, not in tort.220 Justice Zimmerman
reasoned that using tort law rather than contract law to provide a
remedy was akin to using a cleaver rather than a scalpel to remove
a brain tumor.221 He further cautioned the court-
... [W]e should proceed with special delicacy lest we demonstrate that the
fashioning of these rules is a task too subtle for our skills and one better
performed by others.
222
Then, in a footnote to this cautionary comment, Justice Zimmer-
man referred to META as an example of the way in which the
court might be replaced by others seemingly better suited to the
task.
23
Professor St. Antoine has likewise predicted that:
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... we shall shortly see on the legal landscape only the decaying husk of the
doctrine of employment at will. The far more wholesome theory of just
cause will have taken its place."24
He is undoubtedly right. It is not as clear, however, that in its pre-
sent form META contains the seed best suited to produce a
healthy crop of the doctrine of just cause.
Jeanne Duquette Gorr
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